This paper studies …rms' incentives to invest in environmental R&D under different market structures (Cournot and Bertrand) and environmental policy instruments (emission standards, taxes, tradeable permits and auctioned permits). Because of market strategic e¤ects, R&D incentives vary widely across market structures and instruments. For example, when …rms' products are strategic substitutes (i.e., Cournot), either emission standards, taxes or auctioned permits can provide the most incentives. But when …rms' products are strategic complements, either taxes or auctioned permits provide the most incentives. If markets are perfectly competitive, however, permits and emission standards o¤er similar incentives that
are lower than those o¤ered by taxes (JEL: L13, L50, Q28; key words: environment, regulation, market structure, innovation)
Introduction
The relationship between market structure and technical progress has attracted significant attention from economists over the last decades. Motivated by the notion that technical progress is perhaps the main vehicle to solve environmental problems in the long-run (Kneese and Schultze, 1978) , economists have also focused on the extent to which di¤erent environmental policy instruments provide …rms with incentives to invest in environmental R&D. 1 This latter work has been carried out under the assumption of perfect competition, abstracting from market structure considerations (Tietenberg, 1985; Milliman and Prince, 1989; Jung et al., 1996; Requate, 1998; and Parry, 1999 ). 2 In general, authors have found that market-based regulatory instruments such as taxes, tradeable permits and auctioned permits provide more R&D incentives than commandand-control instruments such as emission standards. 3 In this paper, I extend the study of …rms' incentives to invest in environmental R&D by considering the possibility of imperfect competition in output and permit markets.
Since real-world markets are rarely perfectly competitive, extending the environmental 1 See, for example, Hahn and Stavins (1992) , and Newell et al. (1999) for very recent empirical work. 2 One exception is Biglaiser and Horotiwz (1995) that consider …rms interaction in the market for the discovery of new pollution-control technologies and assume perfect competition in the output market. While they focus on the optimal design of a technology standard coupled with a tax, in this paper I focus on the comparison among individual instruments. 3 Less consistent with the above …ndings are the works of Magat (1978) and Malueg (1989) , who showed that relative incentives may vary depending on …rm's speci…c technologies and elements of instrument design. La¤ont and Tirole (1996) have also shown that plain tradeable permits may o¤er little R&D incentives, but the introduction of advance permits and options can restore these incentives. However, they did not compare permits with other instruments. innovation literature to allow for imperfect competition can have important policy implications. In fact, the industrial organization literature has shown that strategic or market interactions in oligopoly markets can signi…cantly a¤ect "investment decisions", including cost-reducing R&D (Brander and Spencer, 1983; Spence, 1984; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984; and Bulow et al., 1985) . 4 Depending on the market structure, some …rms may have incentives to overinvest while others may have incentives to underinvest. While it is likely that these strategic interactions also a¤ect …rms' incentives to invest in environmental R&D, it remains to be seen whether the changes in incentives signi…cantly a¤ect the "environmental R&D rankings" found by previous studies. It may well be that incentives under market-based instruments are still greater (although di¤erent in magnitude from the earlier …ndings) than they are under command-and-control instruments.
To study the e¤ect of imperfect competition on environmental R&D, I extend the model of Montero (2002) and have two …rms (1 and 2) competing in either quantities (i.e., Cournot competition) or prices (i.e., Bertrand competition) in the output market and at the same time being subject to an environmental regulation. The regulatory goal is to limit emissions at some predetermined level by means of one of the following four regulatory instruments: emission standards, taxes, (grandfathered) tradeable permits and auctioned permits. Firms can reduce their compliance costs and improve their position in the output market by investing in environmental R&D.
As explained by Tirole (1988, pp. 323-336) , in such a market-regulatory setting, …rm 1's incentive to invest in R&D results from two e¤ects. The direct or cost-minimizing e¤ect accounts for that fraction of …rm 1's cost savings (or pro…t increase) that does not a¤ect …rm 2's choice of output. In other words, this e¤ect would exist even if …rm 1's R&D investment were not observed by …rm 2 before the latter determined its output. The strategic e¤ect, on the other hand, results from the in ‡uence of …rm 1's R&D investment on …rm 2's choice of output. For example, …rm 2 may increase its output as an optimal response to …rm 1's R&D investment adversely a¤ecting …rm 1's pro…ts. Hence, it may be optimal for …rm 1 to invest less in R&D in order to avoid an aggressive response by …rm 2 in the output market. The sign of this strategic e¤ect may be positive or negative depending on the market-regulatory structure. Not surprisingly, after accounting for direct and strategic e¤ects, the results of this paper indicate that the "R&D rankings" of instruments di¤er in many ways from earlier …ndings. In fact, I …nd situations in which standards o¤er greater R&D incentives than the other three instruments.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I develop the basic model and explain how to estimate …rms' incentives to invest in environmental R&D. In Section 3, I assume that …rms compete à la Cournot in the output market and estimate R&D incentives under the four aforementioned regulatory instruments. In Section 4, I repeat the analysis of Section 3 but now assuming that …rms compete à la Bertrand. In Section 5, I develop some numerical examples to illustrate and complement some of the analytical results of the previous sections using the social optimum solution as a benchmark. In Section 6, I discuss R&D under perfect competition and provide concluding remarks.
The Model
Consider 2 pro…t-maximizing …rms (denoted by i and j) competing under di¤erent market and regulatory structures. When …rms compete à la Cournot in the output market (i.e., …rms' outputs are strategic substitutes), the inverse demand function is P = P (Q), where P is the output market price and Q = q i + q j is industry output. When …rms compete á la Bertrand (i.e., …rms' outputs are strategic complements), the demand curve faced by
, where p i is the price chosen by …rm i.
Without loss of generality, …rm i produces q i at no cost, and in the absence of any regulation, production leads also to q i units of emission. Emissions can be reduced at a total cost of C(r i ), where r i is the amount of emissions reduced, and, as usual,
It is convenient to re-write the abatement function as C i (q i ¡ e i ), where q i ¡ e i´ri and e i is …rm i's emissions after abatement. Thus, if the …rm does not abate
any pollution e i = q i .
The environmental regulatory structure consists of a goal and instrument. I assume that the regulatory goal is to limit aggregate emissions at some level E = e i + e j by means of one of the following four regulatory instruments: emission standards, taxes, (grandfathered) tradeable permits and auctioned permits. Under emission standards, …rms' emissions are limited to e i and e j respectively, such that e i + e j = E. Under tax regulation, …rms pay ¿ dollars for each unit of emissions. The tax level ¿ is set based on the production technology, output demand, and current abatement technology (i.e., before R&D) to yield E. Under permits regulation, a total number of E permits are either distributed freely or auctioned o¤. I assume that each instrument design remains unchanged regardless the amount of R&D undertaken afterwards. Alternatively, one could assume that the regulator is unable to observe R&D investments or that observes them after a long time.
Firms engage in output competition taking into account R&D investments that can reduce their environmental compliance costs, and hence, their ability to compete in the market. Following Spence (1984) , I assume that if …rm i and …rm j invest in environmental R&D, abatement costs reduce from
, where k i is a R&D production function of the form
where Depending on the regulatory instrument, the solution of the model involves either a two-period or three-period equilibrium. In the case of emission standards and taxes there are two periods. First, the two …rms choose R&D levels K i and K j respectively, which 5 This way of modeling innovation applies more naturally to production process innovation at the …rm. For example, under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendements electric utilities have been making "R&D e¤orts" to retro…t their boilers to burn di¤erent type of coals and hence reduce their compliance costs. 6 Although one could simply treat K i as dollars invested in R&D, this formulation facilitates the numerical resolution of the model. Still, I will often use the words "R&D investment" to refer to K. 7 Note that innovation process could also be modeled as a patent race where …rms compite to discover a new technology k (< 1) that reduces abatement costs. This sort of race gives rise to the "common pool" e¤ect where …rms tend to overinvesment in R&D (Loury, 1979 ); something we do not have in this model but that should not change the qualitative results of the paper. are known to both …rms, and then, actions a i and a j (which can be either quantities or prices), and emission levels e i and e j are simultaneously determined. In the case of permits, there are three periods. First, the two …rms choose R&D investments K i and K j , then, emission levels e i and e j (by the amount of permits withheld) and permits price ¾ are determined, and …nally, actions a i and a j are resolved. 8 To decide upon the amount of R&D to undertake, …rms must have some expectation about how the permits and output markets' equilibria will be resolved. I assume, that for any given level of R&D, …rms have complete information, and therefore, correctly anticipate the Nash equilibrium afterwards, which is resolved either as a Cournot game or as a Bertrand game with di¤erentiated products. When the environmental regulation takes the form of tradeable or auctioned permits, I assume that for any given level of R&D and expected output, …rms Nash bargain over the permits price ¾ (total quantity is …xed at E). Since information is complete and there are no income e¤ects, the Nash bargaining solution leads to the e¢cient level of emissions for any given level of investment (K i and K j ) and expected actions (a i and a j ), regardless the initial distribution of the tradeable permits (Spulber, 1989) .
The optimal amount of R&D to undertake by …rm i under di¤erent market and regulatory structures could be obtained from maximizing
represents …rm i's pro…ts resulting from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the permits (if it is the case) and output markets after observing R&D levels K i and K j . 
The solution K
¤ i must satisfy d¼ i (K i ; K j )=dK i = v i , where d¼ i (K i ; K j )=dK i is¼ i (k i ; k j ) with respect to k i , that is d¼ i =dk i . Because K ¤ i solves d¼ i dK i = d¼ i dk i f 0 (K i + µK j ) = v i(2)
R&D under Cournot competition
In this section, I solve the model and estimate the value of ¡d¼ i =dk i for each regulatory instrument when …rms compete à la Cournot. I assume that …rms are symmetric in all respects, including their allocation of emission standards and tradeable permits. 9 Since k = f ((1 + µ)K), the FOC (2) can be entirely written as a function of k as d¼=dk = v=f 0 (f ¡1 (k)), which solution k ¤ will be unique and independent of µ. Note, however, that K ¤ is a decreasing function of µ.
Emission Standards
Under emission standards regulation and Cournot competition, for any given a level of k i and k j (or K i and K j ), …rm i maximizes pro…ts
subject to e i · e i , where e i is the emission standard established for …rm i and Q = q i + q j . Setting e i = e i , the second-period equilibrium is given by the following …rst-order
The third term of (4) indicates that the environmental regulation rises marginal production costs by an amount equal to marginal abatement cost at e i = e i , which depends on the amount of R&D undertaken.
The incentives to invest in R&D are obtained from the (negative) value of the total derivative of (3) with respect to k i at the optimum level of output and emissions. Using the envelope theorem, this derivative is equal to
The …rst term on the right-hand side (RHS) of (5) is the direct e¤ect, which is always positive and increasing with the amount of abatement q i ¡ e i . Hence, the tighter the standard (i.e., the lower e becomes) the higher the direct incentives.
The second term on the RHS of (5) is the strategic e¤ect. This e¤ect results from the in ‡uence of R&D investment on …rm j's second period action. Since P 0 < 0, its sign depends on the sign of dq j =dk i . In this emission-standards-Cournot game, environmental R&D can be interpreted as pure cost-reducing innovation, and therefore we should expect that dq j =dk i > 0. The implication is that a lower k i , which means lower marginal abatement costs k i C 0 i , raises …rm j's relative costs reducing its output. This interaction in the output market results in a positive strategic e¤ect, leading to more R&D than otherwise.
Obtaining an expression for dq j =dk i (see Appendix A), eq. (5) becomes
Assuming that P 0 + P 00 q < 0 to insure the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in output (Gaudet and Salant, 1991) , the fraction dq j =dk i of the second term in (6) is indeed positive and so is the strategic e¤ect. 10 Using Fudenberg and
Tirole's (1984) taxonomy, under these market and regulatory structures where products are strategic substitutes, …rm's optimal strategy is to behave as a "top dog" and overinvest in R&D.
11 10 Note that the second term becomes also positive for a linear demand curve. 11 Note that we are in a case of accomodation of entry rather than entry deterrence.
Taxes
Under tax regulation and Cournot competition, for any given a level of k i and k j , …rm i maximizes pro…ts
where ¿ is a …xed tax that …rm i must pay for each unit of emission. The second-period equilibrium is given by the FOCs for e i and q i
Equation (8) indicates that at the optimum, marginal abatement costs are equal to the tax level ¿ , which implies that the oligopoly structure of the industry does not a¤ect the cost-e¤ectiveness property of taxes. Eq. (9) shows that the environmental regulation rises the marginal cost of production by ¿ , which is independent of the amount of R&D.
The latter is because the …rm simultaneously adjusts q i and e i for (8) to always hold. According to (9) then the optimal q i is independent of k i and k j , which in turn implies that q j will be independent of k i and k j as well. The reason is that the marginal cost of production (which here reduces to environmental compliance only) for both …rms is constant at ¿ . 12 Therefore, dq j =dk i = 0 and the (negative) value of the total derivative 12 Note that if we let the production cost be cq the total marginal production cost will still be constant of (7) with respect to k i at the optimum is, from the envelope theorem, equal to
Under tax regulation there is no strategic e¤ect because …rm i's R&D investments do not a¤ect its marginal production costs (they do a¤ect total costs), and consequently, its output.
Let us now compare incentives under taxes and under emission standards. Equation (10) di¤ers from (6) in some important ways. First, before any investment in R&D is undertaken (i.e., k i = 1), (4) and (9) indicate that output levels are the same by regulatory design (tax level ¿ leads to emissions e i before R&D). This implies that the direct e¤ect C i (q i ¡ e i ) is the same for both emission standards and taxes. However, under emission standards regulation there is a positive strategic e¤ect that increases R&D incentives, which is measured by the second term of (6). Thus, if the R&D function f(¢)
is such that only mild innovations take place (optimal k close to 1), R&D is likely to be higher under emission standards.
Second, at positive levels of R&D (i.e., k i < 1), the direct e¤ect is greater under taxes because the corresponding abatement level is larger. Re-writing the output FOCs
and equal to c + ¿ .
we can observe that under tax regulation q i is independent of k i , while under emission standards q i must increase if k i drops for eq. (11) to continue holding given that e i is …xed and P 0 + P 00 q < 0 by assumption (to insure the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in output). From the latter, we also have that an increase in q i reduces the LHS of (11) below the LHS of (12) . This implies that the amount of abatement under emission standards, q i ¡ e i , is lower than under taxes and so is the direct e¤ect.
The importance of the strategic e¤ect of emission standards relative to the direct e¤ect of either taxes or standards depends on the demand curve P (Q) and the emissions goal E. To see this in a very simple way, consider the following change to the marketregulatory situation: a positive parallel shift of a linear demand curve from P to ®P (® > 1), with P 0 < 0 and P 00 = 0 unchanged, and the same tax level ¿ , which necessarily implies a higher emissions goal E and emission standards e i . Under tax regulation, this new situation leads to higher output q i (see (9)), same abatement q i ¡ e i (see eq. (8)), and hence, higher emissions. Now, the direct e¤ect of either instrument at any k i remains unchanged because the optimal amount of abatement is not a¤ected by ®. 13 And from (6) and P 00 = 0, we can see that the strategic e¤ect increases with q. Thus, by increasing ® (and adjusting E accordingly) we can let the strategic e¤ect of emission standards to 13 In the case of taxes is immediate since ¿ has not changed. In the case of emission standards note, …rst, that abatement q i ¡ e i at k = 1 is independent of ® and, from (4) , that
be as large as we like without a¤ecting the direct e¤ect under either instrument. We can summarize the comparison between taxes and emission standards in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under Cournot competition in the output market, taxes can provide more, less, or the same R&D incentives than emission standards.
The R&D ranking between taxes and emission standards will ultimately depend on the relative importance of the regulatory goal, output demand and R&D production function f(¢). Emission standards are likely to o¤er greater R&D incentives when the f (¢) and v are such that only minor innovations take place, and when output demand is large and/or more inelastic for the strategic e¤ects to be more important. On the other hand, taxes are likely to provide more incentives at stricter regulatory levels (higher ¿ and lower e) because direct e¤ects become relatively more important. We shall illustrate these results with the aid of numerical examples.
Permits
Because grandfathered tradeable permits and auctioned permits are very closely related, I shall merge their analysis into one but emphasizing their di¤erences as they arise. Thus, under "permits" regulation and Cournot competition, for any given level of k i and k j , …rm i maximizes pro…ts
where ² i is amount of (tradeable) permits received by …rm i and ¾ is the market clearing price of permits after a total of E permits are distributed gratis by the regulator. If instead, the E permits are auctioned o¤, ² i = 0 and both …rms become buyers of permits.
The auction clearing price is the same as in the permits market because there are no income e¤ects.
Since the permits market (or auction market) operates …rst, we start by solving the third-period output equilibrium. Firm i takes e i as given, which is the number of permits withheld in the second period, and maximizes
Letting b q i (e i ) be the solution to the third-period output equilibrium, in the second period …rm i chooses e i to maximize
. Using the envelope theorem, the Nash bargaining equilibrium in the permits market is given by (Spulber, 1989) 14
Thus, the (negative) value of the total derivative of (13) with respect to k i at the 14 Firms bargain over ¾ until no further exchange of permits is mutually bene…cial while taking into account their correct expectation of future outputs b q i and b q j .
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the permits and output markets is
The …rst term on the RHS of (17) is the direct e¤ect, the second term is the strategic e¤ect from the output market and the third term is the strategic e¤ect from the permits market. While the sign of the direct e¤ect is clearly positive, the sign of other two e¤ects is not so immediate.
In a permits-Cournot game, environmental R&D cannot readily be interpreted as pure cost-reducing innovation because there is an interaction in the permits market. Hence, dq j =dk i may no longer be positive as it was under standards. In fact, we have that (see
which is negative, since P 0 + P 00 q < 0 by assumption. The implication is that a lower k i , which means lower marginal abatement costs k i C 0 i , reduces …rm j's relative costs, increasing its output. The explanation is that any R&D investment made by …rm i "spills over" through the permits market, lowering the price ¾ and consequently reducing abatement costs for both …rms in the same amount at the margin, which ultimately helps …rm j to increase output.
Investments in R&D also a¤ect the permits market. As formally demonstrated in Appendix B, the total e¤ect of R&D on the permits price is negative (i.e., d¾=dk i > 0), regardless of who invest in R&D; otherwise …rms' production would be lower after R&D since marginal production costs are equal to ¾ (see (14) ). The sign of this strategic e¤ect from the permits market depends on whether the …rm i is a seller or buyer of permits. If the …rm is a buyer of permits (e i > ² i ), this e¤ect is positive because the …rm now buys permits at a lower price.
Thus, the total derivative (17) becomes
While the strategic e¤ect from the output market is always negative for either tradeable permits or auctioned permits, the strategic e¤ect from the permits market is zero under tradeable permits (e = ²) and positive under auctioned permits (² = 0). Therefore, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Under Cournot competition in the output market and imperfect competition in the permits market, a buyer of permits has greater R&D incentives than a seller of permits, and consequently, auctioned permits lead to more R&D than grandfathered permits.
In terms of the Fudenberg and Tirole's (1984) taxonomy, eq. (19) indicates that when products are strategic substitutes and …rms are under tradeable permits regulation, it is optimal to follow a "lean and hungry look" strategy and underinvest in R&D. If …rms are under auctioned permits regulation, it may be optimal to follow a "top dog" strategy and overinvest in R&D.
The comparison between tradeable permits and the other two regulatory instruments, emission standards and taxes, is rather straightforward. At any value of k, direct e¤ects under tradeable permits and standards are the same and lower than direct e¤ects under taxes (unless k = 1 in which case are equal). And since strategic e¤ects under tradeable permits are always negative, it follows:
Proposition 3 Under Cournot competition in the output market and imperfect competition in the permits market, tradeable permits o¤er less R&D incentives than either emission standards or taxes.
The comparison between auctioned permits and emission standards and taxes is more involved. At any value of k, direct e¤ects under auctioned permits and standards are the same and lower than direct e¤ects under taxes (unless k = 1 in which case they are equal). On the other hand, strategic e¤ects from the permits market can be large enough for total e¤ects to be higher than total e¤ects under standards and taxes, as we shall see in the numerical section. Thus, we can establish Proposition 4 Under Cournot competition in the output market and imperfect competition in the permits market, auctioned permits can o¤er more, less, or the same R&D incentives than either emission standards or taxes.
Results so far are based on the assumption of …rms engaged in quantity competition for the output market. As Fundenberg and Tirole (1984) and Tirole (1988) have already shown, the sign of the strategic e¤ect may change as …rms engage in price competition for the output market. As we shall see below, this does not necessarily mean that previous propositions simply revert under price competition. There are regulatory interactions that must be taken into account as well.
R&D under Bertrand competition
In this section, I repeat the previous analysis but assuming instead that …rms compete à la Bertrand with di¤erentiated products. The demand curve faced by …rm i is q iD
Because products are not necessarily homogenous (i) simply indicates that a …rm's price change has an equal or larger e¤ect on its own demand than on its rival's. On the other hand,
(ii) says that a …rm's price increase has a smaller e¤ect on its own demand the larger the price of its rival. I also assume that D i (p i ; p j ) is not too convex in p i ; otherwise second order conditions (SOCs) do not hold. To avoid cluster I will sometimes use the 
Emission standards
Under emission standards regulation and Bertrand competition, for any given a level of k i and k j , …rm i maximizes pro…ts
The FOC for p i is
and the (negative) value of total derivative of (20) at the optimum level of prices is
Because @D i =@p j > 0 and p i > k i C 0 i (capacity constraints allow …rm i to exercise some market power even if product are homogenous), the sign of the strategic e¤ect depends on dp j =dk i (see Appendix C for its derivation). Plugging dp j =dk i (see Appendix C for its derivation) into (22) we obtain for symmetric …rms
where
SOCs for a local maximum require that A < 0 and A 2 ¡B 2 > 0 (see Appendix C), so, as in the Cournot game, dp j =dk i > 0. Thus, (23) indicates that in this market structure where products are strategic complements, …rm's optimal strategy is to behave as a "puppy dog" and underinvest in R&D.
Taxes
Under tax regulation and Bertrand competition, for any given level of k i and k j , …rm i maximizes pro…ts
The FOCs for e i and p i are, respectively
Expression (26) indicates that p i and p j are not a¤ected by the choice of k i and k j , so the total derivative of (24) at the equilibrium is given by
As before, under tax regulation there is no strategic e¤ect because …rm i's R&D investments do not a¤ect its marginal production costs, and consequently, its output. Now, we can compare R&D incentives under taxes and emission standards, given by eqs. (27) and (23) respectively, when …rms play a Bertrand game in the output market.
Before any investment in R&D is undertaken (i.e., k = 1), (26) and (21) indicate that output levels are the same by regulatory design (¿ leads to emissions e). This implies that the direct e¤ect C(q ¡ e) is the same for both emission standards and taxes. However, under emission standards regulation there is a negative strategic e¤ect that reduces R&D incentives, which is measured by the second term of (23) . Similarly, at positive levels of R&D (i.e., k < 1), the direct e¤ect is greater under taxes because the corresponding abatement level is larger. Since strategic e¤ects continue to be negative for emission standards, it immediately follows the next proposition.
Proposition 5 Under Bertrand competition in the output market, taxes o¤er more R&D incentives than emission standards.
Permits
As before, the analysis of grandfathered tradeable permits and auctioned permits are merged into one. Under permits regulation and Bertrand competition, for any given level of k i and k j , …rm i maximizes pro…ts
where ² i is amount of (tradeable) permits received by …rm i and ¾ is the market clearing price of permits after a total of E permits are distributed gratis by the regulator. If instead, the E permits are auctioned o¤, ² i = 0 and both …rms are buyers of permits.
Again, the auction clearing price remains the same as in the permits market because there are no income e¤ects.
Since the permits market (or auction market) operates …rst, we start by solving the third-period output equilibrium. Firm i takes e i as given, which is the amount of permits withheld in the second-period, and maximizes
Letting b p i´b p i (e i ) be the solution to the third-period price equilibrium, in the second period …rm i chooses e i to maximize b
Using the envelope theorem, the Nash bargaining equilibrium in the permits market is given by (Spulber, 1989) 16
Thus, the (negative) value of the total derivative of (28) with respect to k i at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the permits and output market is
where the second term of the RHS of (32) is the strategic e¤ect from the output market, and the third term is the strategic e¤ect from the permits market.
Since p i > k i C 0 i and @D i =@p j > 0, the sign of the strategic e¤ect from the output 16 Firms bargain over ¾ based on their correct expectation of future prices b p i and b p j .
market depends on the sign of dp j =dk i , which is (see Appendix D) dp
where A and B are as in section 4.1. Since SOCs require that A + B < 0 (see Appendix C), we also have that dp j =dk i > 0. In this permits-Bertrand game, …rm i's R&D (i.e., lower k) leads …rm j to reduce its action p j , and hence increase its pro…ts, not only because of output complementarity but also because any R&D investment "spills over"
through the permits market reducing abatement costs for both …rms in the same amount at the margin. Because of this latter e¤ect, it is not di¢cult to show that dp j =dk i under permits is always greater than under emission standards. Formally, this is the case because A + B < 0.
The sign of the strategic e¤ect in the permits market depends on the sign of d¾=dk i and on whether the …rm i is a seller or buyer of permits. Since d¾=dk i > 0 (see Appendix D for its derivation), 17 when a …rm is a buyer of permits (e i > ² i ), the strategic e¤ect from the permits market is positive. Accounting for strategic e¤ects in both permits and output markets, the total derivative (32) becomes
In terms of the Fudenberg and Tirole's (1984) taxonomy, eq. (34) indicates that when 17 The value of d¾=dk i is unambiguously positive when either products are homogeneous (i.e., D products are strategic complements, under tradeable permits regulation (i.e., e = ²) it is optimal for a …rm to follow a "puppy dog" strategy and underinvest in R&D. Under auctioned permits regulation (i.e., ² = 0), on the other hand, it may be optimal for a …rm to follow a "fat cat" strategy and overinvest in R&D.
We now can proceed to compare permits with emission standards and taxes. Comparing R&D incentives under tradeable permits (e = ²) and emission standards only requires to compare dp j =dk i since direct e¤ects are the same for both instruments at any value of k. Consequently, we have the following proposition Proposition 6 Under Bertrand competition in the output market and imperfect competition in the permits market, tradeable permits o¤er less R&D incentives than emission standards.
Comparing auctioned permits and taxes (see eq. (27)) follows directly from the discussion between taxes and emission standards of Section 3.2. Before R&D (i.e., k i = 1), direct e¤ects are the same by regulatory design. At positive levels of R&D (i.e., k i < 1), however, direct e¤ects are larger under taxes while strategic e¤ects may be positive under auctioned permits. For instance, if we reduce D 0 2 su¢ciently enough so that the strategic e¤ect from the output market under auctioned permits decreases, ¡d¼=dk can become greater under auctioned permits than under taxes. On the other hand, if we make the regulatory goal stricter (i.e., e is only a small fraction of q) so that the direct e¤ect under both instruments increases, ¡d¼=dk can become greater under taxes than under auctioned permits. Therefore, we can establish the following proposition Proposition 7 Under Bertrand competition in the output market and imperfect compe-tition in the permits market, auctioned permits can o¤er more, less or the same R&D incentives than taxes.
Some Numerical Examples
In this section, I develop some numerical examples to illustrate and complement some of the analytical results shown in the previous sections. The examples are not randomly selected, but rather to emphasize di¤erences between direct and strategic e¤ects.
The social optimum: a benchmark
To compare R&D incentives under di¤erent market and regulatory structures, it is useful to start by establishing some benchmark. For that purpose, I use the optimization problem of a social planner pursuing …rst-best levels of output, emissions and R&D.
This will also allow us to have some estimate of the divergence between private and social optimum R&D levels. However, we do not discuss R&D policies that could bring private investment to social optimum levels because that would also require discussion of competition policies, which is not the purpose of the paper.
To …nd the social optimum, let …rst h be the marginal harm caused by a unit of emission (assumed constant for simplicity but without implications for the R&D comparisons). Thus, at any given level of k i and k j , the …rst-best output and emission levels
where p is the output price in either the Cournot or Bertrand game. In our simple model, (35) indicates that prices are equal to total marginal costs (recall that output costs are zero), and (36) indicates that marginal abatement costs must be equal to marginal damage. The …rst-best solution can be achieved by either setting the tax level ¿ = h or by issuing (or auctioning o¤) an amount E permits such that the equilibrium price of permits ¾ is equal to h (because of the symmetry of the problem, the social planner could also achieve the …rst-best by setting emission standards e equal to E=2).
Now, for any given level of
e j )h be the optimum level of social welfare, where CS(q i ; q j ) is consumer surplus, and q i and e i are at their …rst-best levels as estimated above from (35) and (36). To …nd the …rst-best levels of R&D,
subject to (1) . From the envelope theorem and the symmetry of the problem, the solution is given by dW dk
Using the above …rst-best solution as a benchmark case, I start the numerical examples with Cournot competition, and then, Bertrand competition.
Cournot examples
Let P (Q) = a ¡ bQ be the demand curve and C(q ¡ e) = (q ¡ e) 2 be abatement costs before R&D, where Q = 2q. Let k = f (K T ) = (1 ¡°)e ¡K T +°be the R&D production function, where 0 <°< 1, K T = (1 + µ)K, and K is the amount of R&D e¤ort by each …rm in the equilibrium. 18 The market and regulatory parameters are chosen to yield a signi…cant amount of emissions abatement. To simplify matters, the regulatory design is such that before R&D, marginal abatement costs are equal to marginal harm h. Table 1 ("Before R&D") shows market and regulatory characteristics before R&D takes place. The regulatory design imposes a signi…cant reduction, q ¡ e, upon …rms of 50%, which is achieved by either levying a tax ¿ = 10, issuing a total number of permits E = 10, which leads to ¾ = 10, or setting emission standards e = 5 for each …rm. Note that the reason for the output price P (Q) to be close to marginal costs is because the large price elasticity (¡3 at the market equilibrium), which will make strategic e¤ects to be relatively less important than direct e¤ects. Firm's optimal R&D e¤orts, K, for three e¤ects from the output market are now much more important than direct e¤ects, which leads to higher R&D under standards than under taxes and auctioned permits. 20 I also increase v to 5.7 for the same reasons above.
Bertrand examples
In the following examples, I continue using a linear demand curve and let 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have compared a …rm's incentives to invest in environmental R&D under di¤erent market structures and environmental policy instruments. Because of market strategic e¤ects, R&D incentives are found to vary widely across market structures and instruments. In particular, I found that when …rms' products are strategic substitutes (i.e., Cournot), either emission standards, taxes or auctioned permits can provide the most incentives. But when …rms' products are strategic complements (i.e., di¤erentiated Bertrand), either taxes or auctioned permits can provide the most incentives.
A natural question that remains is how the results of the paper change as markets become more competitive. To answer this question, we can simply extend the model from two to a large number of …rms competing à la Cournot. Strategic e¤ects no longer matter, so we need only concentrate on direct e¤ects, or more precisely, on abatement levels q i ¡e i .
Before R&D (i.e., k = 1), direct e¤ects are the same for all instruments by regulatory design. By the same arguments laid out in the paper (see Section 3.2 for example), at positive levels of R&D (i.e., k < 1), however, direct e¤ects are higher under taxes than under permits and emission standards because abatement is higher. Consequently, under perfect competition, tradeable permits, auctioned permits and emission standards lead to the same amount of R&D but lower than taxes.
Additional to the above …nding is that under perfect competition R&D incentives are not a¤ected by the way the permits are initially distributed among …rms, and that is why incentives under grandfathered permits auctioned permits are the same. This is in sharp contrast with previous literature (e.g., Milliman and Prince, 1989; and Jung et al, 1996) , where authors fail to distinguish between cost savings (including permits payments) and innovation incentives. The reason is that for any given output price P and permits price ¾, the e¤ect of a change in k on the pro…ts ¼ of a price-taking …rm does not depend on the distribution of permits ². Even output q is not a¤ected by changes in k, because at the margin the additional production cost from the regulation continues to be ¾.
There a few extensions to the model that may be worth exploring. One extension would be to consider a di¤erent technology innovation process. It could be modeled a as patent race where R&D …rms (other than production …rms) compete for the invention of a more e¢cient technology to be sold to producing …rms either because lowers production costs or because the regulator imposes …rms to adopt the new technology. Note that this has already been done for the case of perfect competition in the output market (Biglaiser and Horowitz, 1995 Appendix A Under Cournot competition and emission standards regulation, the …rst order conditions for …rms i and j are
Taking total derivative with respect to k i at the Nash equilibrium in both expressions we
Then, subtracting (A4) from (A3) and rearranging (A4), we obtain the system of equations that by symmetry reduces to
which leads to
This is the fraction of the last term in (6) in the text.
Appendix B
Under Cournot competition and permits regulation, the equilibrium conditions in the permits and output markets for …rms i and j are given by
Taking total derivative with respect to k i in all four expressions
From (B7) and (B8), we obtain
and replacing (B9) into (B5) and (B10) into (B6), to become (B5') and (B6'), respectively, and then subtracting (B6') from (B5'), we obtain
Then, to …nd dq j =dk i , we replace (B9)-(B11) into either (B5) or (B6) to obtain
and to …nd d¾=dk i , we replace (B9)-(B12) into (B7) to obtain
Appendix C Under Bertrand competition (regardless of whether products are homogeneous or di¤erentiated) and emission standards regulation, the …rst order conditions for …rms i and j are
Taking total derivative with respect to k i at the Nash equilibrium in both expressions, rearranging, assuming symmetry and using the simpli…ed notation (see text) gives A dp i dk i + B dp
B dp i dk i + A dp j dk i = 0
where A = (2D Second order conditions (SOCs) for a local maximum require that A < 0 and A 2 ¡B 2 > 0.
Since B > 0, the SOCs also imply that A + B < 0.
Subtracting (C4) from (C3) and rearranging, we obtain dp j dk i = ¡BD immediate that A < 0, B > 0, A + B < 0 and dp j =dk i > 0.
Appendix D
Under Bertrand competition (regardless of whether products are homogeneous or di¤erentiated) and permits regulation, the equilibrium conditions in the permits and output markets for …rms i and j are given by
e i + e j ¡ E = 0
Taking total derivative with respect to k i in all four expressions (and assuming symmetry) A dp i dk i + B dp
B dp i dk i + A dp j dk i + D 0 1 kC 00 de j dk i = 0 (D6)
where A and B are as in Appendix C. From (D7) and (D8), we obtain
2 µ dp j dk i ¡ dp i dk i ¶ + C 0 2kC 00 (D9)
and replacing (D9) into (D5) and (D10) into (D6), to become (D5') and (D6'), respectively, and then subtracting (D6') from (D5'), we obtain dp i dk i = dp j dk i (D11) Then, to …nd dp j =dk i , we replace (D9)-(D11) into either (D5) or (D6) to obtain dp j dk i = D 
